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141 
The Limitations of Economic Reasoning in 
Analyzing Duress 
Shawn Bayern† 
My colleagues and friends, Mark Seidenfeld and Murat 
Mungan, have made an interesting attempt to reduce the doc-
trine of duress in contract law to an inquiry about “rent-
seeking,” by which they mean attempts to redistribute rather 
than to produce wealth.1  There is much truth in their argu-
ment, and they are admirably sensitive to many factors that 
should be, and are, important in contract-modification cases.  I 
do not think they have shown, however, that duress can work-
ably be reduced to a simple formulation in the way they in-
tend—or that even if it could, it would serve the functional or 
even simply the instrumental goals of contract law to do so.2 
DURESS AS RENT SEEKING  
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument is clear: in judging 
whether a party’s threat is “wrongful” or “improper” for the 
purposes of determining whether it constitutes duress,3 
courts—if they intend to maximize social wealth—should de-
cide whether (1) the threatened conduct serves the interests of 
that party or (2) the threatened conduct is instead motivated 
only to extract value from the other party.  Because a wealth-
maximizing legal regime would encourage productivity but dis-
courage investment in redistribution alone, threats of the first 
type are legitimate, whereas threats of the second type are not.  
 
†  Larry & Joyce Beltz Professor, Florida State University College of 
Law. Copyright © 2015 by Shawn Bayern.  
 1. Mark Seidenfeld & Murat C. Mungan, Duress as Rent Seeking, 99 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (draft on file with author). 
 2. To be clear, I do not think that the law is or should be motivated only 
by propositions of efficiency; other concerns, such as morality and policies oth-
er than efficiency, can and should be significant.   My goal in this essay, how-
ever, is to critique an argument that rests on grounds of efficiency merely by 
showing that it would not achieve its goals.  For that limited purpose, the rest 
of this essay speaks largely in consequentialist terms that seek to promote al-
locative efficiency, accept the general efficiency of markets, and so on. 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). 
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Accordingly, for example, I might decide to plant several trees 
in my front yard because I enjoy trees, and I might inform my 
neighbor that I plan to do so even though I know that my 
neighbor would prefer that I not; if the neighbor subsequently 
offers me something of value to induce me not to plant the 
trees, we would have a legitimate, enforceable contract or ex-
change.4  By contrast, if planting trees gives me no value, but I 
still give my neighbor the opportunity to induce me not to do so, 
my doing so is improper and constitutes duress—and any con-
tract resulting from a threat to plant trees would therefore be 
unenforceable.  I will call this determination of duress—
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s chief proposition—the Rent-Seeking 
Test. 
The Rent-Seeking Test captures something important, 
which is that an element of good faith in contracting and busi-
ness generally is for parties not to act in ways that do not bene-
fit them except to the extent that the activities extract value 
from others.  Accordingly, for example, in the famous case of 
Page v. Page,5 Justice Traynor permitted the dissolution of a 
partnership at will but noted that, “like any other power held 
by a fiduciary,” the decision to dissolve a partnership “must be 
exercised in good faith.”6  Good faith in business law means 
many things,7 but one way to conceive Justice Traynor’s re-
quirement of good faith in Page is that while partners at will 
may ordinarily dissolve a partnership for any reason, they can-
not time or otherwise orchestrate a dissolution to extract more 
value from their partners than they were otherwise able to ne-
gotiate in the partnership agreement.  Thus, Justice Traynor 
wrote: 
A partner may not . . . by use of adverse pressure “freeze 
out” a co-partner and appropriate the business to his own use. 
A partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of 
the business for himself, unless he fully compensates his co-
partner for his share of the prospective business opportunity.8 
The Rent-Seeking Test is broadly consistent with this for-
 
 4. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 13–20. 
 5. 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (citation omitted) (“Even though the Uni-
form Partnership Act provides that a partnership at will may be dissolved by 
the express will of any partner, this power, like any other power held by a fi-
duciary, must be exercised in good faith.”). 
 6. Id.  
 7. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate 
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (outlining multiple meanings of good faith in 
corporate law). 
 8. Page, 359 P.2d at 44. 
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mulation of good faith.  Under the Rent-Seeking Test, a partner 
can dissolve a partnership so long as he benefits from doing so 
in a way other than his “freezing out” of a copartner. 
Moreover, Seidenfeld and Mungan very nicely apply their 
argument to several significant cases.  For example, I largely—
though not completely—agree with their treatment of the diffi-
cult contract-modification case of Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Lo-
ral Corp.,9 which I discuss in Part II.C infra. 
DURESS AS BOTH MORE AND LESS THAN RENT 
SEEKING 
The Rent-Seeking Test, however, is not a principled, con-
sistent, or desirable basis for a general law of duress in contract 
or restitution cases.10  There are four essential problems with 
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument: (1) the lack of administra-
bility of the Rent-Seeking Test; (2) the promotion of short-run 
static efficiency at the expense of longer-run dynamic efficiency 
associated with the assignment of legal entitlements; (3) in con-
tract-modification cases, insufficient attention to the scope of 
the prior agreement and to the relevance of changed circum-
stances, and (4) an explicit exception for rent-seeking behavior 
in contract negotiations that undermines the basis of the Rent-
Seeking Test they propose because it rests on an inconsistent 
distinction between cases in which contracts should be invali-
dated and those in which they should be upheld.  This section 
considers these problems in turn. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE RENT-
SEEKING TEST 
To begin to critique Seidenfeld and Mungan’s essay, it is 
 
 9. 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971). 
 10. It is important to recognize that the function and importance of duress 
is not limited to contract law.  Thus, while duress might be a defense to the 
enforcement of a breach-of-contract claim, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 175 (1981), it might also constitute the basis of a cause of action 
for restitution as a way to reverse a legally executed transfer.  See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 (2011) (“A 
transfer induced by duress is subject to rescission and restitution.”).  Indeed, 
in Austin v. Loral itself, duress arises as the basis of a restitutionary cause of 
action to restore prior payments from the threatened party to the threatening 
party.  See Austin, 272 N.E.2d at 533 (“The defendant, Loral Corporation, 
seeks to recover payment for goods delivered under a contract which it had 
with the plaintiff Austin Instrument, Inc., on the ground that the evidence es-
tablishes, as a matter of law, that it was forced to agree to an increase in price 
on the items in question under circumstances amounting to economic du-
ress.”). 
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important to recognize a simple feature of the legal landscape: 
economic duress is not widespread.  Their essay suggests an ex-
tremely general principle that would invalidate many contracts 
that would today unproblematically be upheld, but the princi-
ple is so broad that it could never appropriately be applied.  
There are a handful of specific circumstances in which courts 
will treat a threat to exercise a legal right as sufficient to con-
stitute economic duress; the most important of these cases in-
volve modifications to contracts, which I discuss infra in Part 
II.C.  The other circumstances are relatively minor, and under 
modern law they are essentially treated as special cases; for 
example, it may be “legal” to file a lawsuit, but the threat to do 
so is improper if the lawsuit is known to be meritless.11  The 
wrongful threat of meritless civil litigation, however, is not a 
significant example of the general use of legal right to amount 
to wrongful threats; in fact, it is something of an aberration, 
perhaps resulting from a reluctance to treat borderline litiga-
tion as criminal or tortious.12 
In any event, Seidenfeld and Mungan’s suggestion that the 
cases are confused in their treatment of threats in general13 
may overstate the matter.  As a descriptive matter, outside the 
contract-modification context and the other special cases, the 
cases do not appear to be confused in the way they claim; they 
simply do not consider there to be a problem.  While there may 
be some cases in which contracts that the law currently up-
holds should probably be invalidated—like the cases of “dis-
tress” that I discuss later in Part II.B, infra—Seidenfeld and 
 
 11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST EN-
RICHMENT § 14 cmt. h. (“The threat or instigation of legal proceedings in pur-
suit of a claim known to be unjustified is wrongful prima facie; such acts con-
stitute duress, and a transfer induced thereby is voidable.”). 
 12. Indeed, the case of threats of civil litigation presents a useful counter-
example to the application of the Rent-Seeking Test.  Suppose A has a legiti-
mate legal claim against B that A nonetheless knows is not worth pursuing, 
economically speaking, because A’s costs of litigation would exceed the (legiti-
mate) proceeds from a judgment.  The Rent-Seeking Test would consider it du-
ress, and thus invalidate a contract or exchange, for A to threaten litigation in 
that case.  That would be a startling result, because it would undermine A’s 
ability to assert a legitimate legal claim against B; A would run the risk of du-
ress for seeking to settle the claim by informing B that he is considering legit-
imate litigation.  As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust En-
richmen t§ 14 cmt. h. nicely puts it:  “Subject to limited exceptions, a good-
faith threat of legal process, though evidently coercive, must be permissible; so 
that a transfer induced thereby is not subject to rescission for duress.”  Id.  
 13. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 15 (“Unfortunately, courts 
have not explained what distinguishes those threats that are wrongful from 
those that are not.”). 
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Mungan propose too general a response to a problem that the 
courts have not recognized. 
So, for example, consider my initial example involving a 
decision to plant trees in my front yard that my neighbor 
doesn’t want.  The law, very clearly, will not inquire as to 
whether I have decided to plant these trees just to extract value 
from my neighbor.  Imagine if it did.  A contract with my 
neighbor not to plant the trees would then be subject to a sub-
jective, individualized inquiry into my valuation of trees, and 
courts are very poorly equipped to conduct such an inquiry.  It 
is important to recognize, despite substantial commentary to 
the contrary, that modern courts are in fact well-equipped to 
make many subjective, individualized inquiries—and that they 
routinely exercise this ability.14  The particular inquiries that 
the Rent-Seeking Test calls for, however, are alien in our judi-
cial system because they depend on largely unverifiable propo-
sitions of personal value.  For example, to determine whether to 
enforce the contract in the case of the forgone trees, a court 
would need to determine whether I would derive any value 
from those trees.  Is it even plausible that there would be a case 
where I could not establish the possibility of that subjective 
value—enough to avoid invalidating the contract under the 
Rent-Seeking Test?  If not, then the case simply shouldn’t be 
subject to a doctrine of economic duress—and that is precisely 
the result under the law.  The Rent-Seeking Test requires an 
analysis that is simply unavailable in the real world—
specifically, a reliable mechanism to determine parties’ valua-
tions of everything without any mechanism for the production 
of information about such valuations.15 
 
 14. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract 
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) (“[C]lassical contract law doctrines 
lay almost wholly at the objective, standardized, and static poles . . . . In con-
trast, modern contract law . . . pervasively (although not completely) consists 
of principles that are individualized, dynamic, multi-faceted, and, in appropri-
ate cases, subjective.”).  As an example, modern courts, even in relatively for-
malist common-law jurisdictions, have had no problem measuring subjective 
values for the purpose of setting contract damages.  See, e.g., Ruxley Elecs. & 
Constr. Ltd. v. Forsyth, 3 All E.R. 268, 273 (1996) (valuing a homeowner’s sub-
jective loss in the enjoyment of a swimming pool with a small defect at 
£2,500). 
 15. The computation of subjective valuation in Ruxley, id., is narrower, 
more purposeful, and more tied to plausible valuation.  Faced with a real harm 
that is impossible to measure objectively, the court decided to compute the 
value subjectively instead of denying damages altogether; it computed these 
damages based on common sense and probably with reference to the contract 
price.  That is a sound result that American courts should follow more than 
they have done.  But it is very different from subjecting every contract to a de-
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It is important to recognize that Seidenfeld and Mungan do 
not claim that their test is administrable or offer an affirmative 
argument in favor of its workability, so this part of my response 
does not in fact critique the internal logic of their argument.  It 
may be that they are simply concerned with elucidating an eco-
nomic effect in theory.  That is fine in theory, but if the ques-
tion is whether a particular test for duress (like the Rent-
Seeking Test) should influence courts’ decisions of cases, the 
administrability of the test is a necessary component of the an-
swer.  Regardless of other criteria that a proposed rule meets, if 
it fails the criterion of administrability then it cannot be adopt-
ed as a rule of law.  As Mel Eisenberg and I have put it in a re-
cent critique of challenges to the expectation measure in con-
tract law: 
In law-and-economics—as opposed to straightforward mi-
croeconomics—the formal validity of a model is only a first test. 
Other tests are whether the legal regime suggested by a model 
is administrable, whether the model takes institutional consid-
erations into account, and whether implementation of the mod-
el would involve more costs than benefits.16 
There is a deeper problem, too, associated with any at-
tempt to implement the Rent-Seeking Test; it is roughly the 
problem that Robert Nozick identified in discussing “utility 
monsters,” or those whom utilitarians might be committed to 
favoring merely because of their strong preferences.17  The key 
determination under Seidenfeld and Mungan’s Rent-Seeking 
Test is whether a party had a reason to make a threat other 
than extracting value from another party, but such reasons 
may be backed—at least for the sort of consequentialists that 
Seidenfeld and Mungan claim to be—by any sort of phenomeno-
logical value.  For example, suppose the property owner in the 
case of the forgone trees derives value from (that is, incorpo-
rates into his utility function) the suffering of his neighbor, or 
values spite, or is characterized by the enjoyment of injustice 
that ancient Greek philosophers called pleonexia.18  In all those 
 
termination of whether every party’s “threats” concerning its legal entitle-
ments would in fact enhance or destroy value for that party. 
 16. Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure 
and Its Discontents, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 37 (2013); see also Melvin A. Ei-
senberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Over-
reliance, 54 Hastings L.J. 1335, 1135–36 (2003) (critiquing an economic argu-
ment concerning contract damages in view of “institutional considerations”). 
 17. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974). 
 18. Cf. Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost 
Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 & 
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cases, the property owner derives value from the planting of 
the trees and thus satisfies the Rent-Seeking Test.  Moreover, 
these cases complicate the workability of the test; not only do 
we need to measure subjective valuation of trees, but we must 
also be sensitive to all potential motivations the property owner 
has for planting them. 
Consider a more specific, complex example: E, an environ-
mentalist, wishes to drive out of business D, a local dry-
cleaning establishment that uses the very toxic perchloroeth-
ylene as its cleaning solving.  As a result, E makes the follow-
ing threat to D: “If you do not sell me your business by the end 
of the week at the below-market rate of $50,000 so that I can 
immediately shut it down, I will set up a much cheaper dry-
cleaning establishment across the street.  I won’t make any 
money doing this, because the ‘green’ solvent is much more ex-
pensive than perchloroethylene, but I don’t care; my sole pur-
pose will be to draw business from your store until you go out of 
business.”  Ignoring the potential federal antitrust implications 
of a business’s seeking to shutter another through predatory 
pricing,19 does E’s threat pass or fail the Rent-Seeking Test?  If 
D concedes to E’s threat, then on one hand E has extracted val-
ue from D by threatening to engage in unprofitable behavior; 
on the other hand, E may enjoy driving an environmentally un-
friendly operation out of business, or she simply may enjoy 
running an economically unproductive dry-cleaning business.  
Even if we could somehow avoid the conceptual difficulties that 
these questions indicate for the Rent-Seeking Test, how would 
we ever practically answer the question?  
THE LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY OF PREALLOCATING 
ENTITLEMENTS 
The Rent-Seeking test faces problems other than its ad-
ministrability.  It is also unsound as an efficiency-promoting 
test because it would undermine a system of entitlements (un-
der, for example, property law) in favor of a short-run, static 
criterion of efficiency—that is, whether a single transaction ap-
pears, based on an analysis with limited scope, to produce val-
 
n. 38 (2009) (discussing potential psychological benefits from injustice); Thom-
as Morawetz, Adam, Eve, and Emma: On Criminal Responsibility and Moral 
Wisdom, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23, 28 (2003) (suggesting that criminals may 
benefit merely from “even just the satisfaction of having broken a rule”). 
 19. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1986) 
(“Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of 
cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing 
competition in the long run. . . . [It is] capable of inflicting antitrust injury.”). 
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ue.  The efficiency of a legal rule cannot be decided by evaluat-
ing only static, short-run, context-free criteria. 
The lack of an existing, sweeping economic-duress doctrine 
in the case of the forgone trees suggests, if the law is broadly 
efficient, simply that the law recognizes the longer-run efficien-
cy of property law’s allocation of entitlements.  I have pur-
chased a right to plant the trees (and thus extract the value 
that arises from doing so), and enforcing that right is easier 
(and less expensive) than determining whether I value it sub-
jectively.  Legal economists have long recognized, in studying 
the law and theory of property ownership, that legal property 
regimes reduce transaction costs by making entitlements 
clear.20  Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument would muddy oth-
erwise clear entitlements at very significant cost.  Note that 
every contract would be subject to their test; every contractual 
offer is an implicit threat to do, or not to do, something, and the 
Rent-Seeking Test would require that each offer be evaluated 
for rent-seeking.21 
There is, however, a class of case—which Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg has called “distress” rather than “duress”22—that is 
more problematic than the case of the forgone trees.  Cases of 
distress involve one party’s taking advantage of another’s ad-
ventitiously hard position.23  Ordinarily such cases involve 
price gouging in some way.24  Seidenfeld and Mungan’s exam-
ple involving water sold during a hurricane fits this pattern,25 
as does Eisenberg’s example of a traveler stranded in the desert 
who promises his rescuer $100,000 in exchange for a rescue.26  
These cases are important, and they perhaps represent an area 
where existing doctrine is wrong not to recognize a potential 
defense to enforcement. 
 
 20. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 81–86 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 21. Existing efficient entitlements may also arise from statutes.  For ex-
ample, labor unions have the right to organize and to strike.  But a pure appli-
cation of the Rent-Seeking Test would perversely prevent all threats by a un-
ion to stop work and strike, because doing so would not produce more new 
value than continuing work.  Perhaps that result could be called efficient on 
an extremely short-run view (in the simple sense that work is more productive 
than work stoppages), but it would ignore the longer-run efficiencies that the 
labor statutes offer in correcting a market failure. 
 22. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 741, 754–63 (1982). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 16–18. 
 26. Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 755. 
2015] LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC REASONING 149 
 
Ironically, however, Seidenfeld and Mungan’s analysis gets 
these cases exactly wrong, even from the perspective of efficien-
cy.  While they would complicate enforceability in the case of 
the forgone trees, they would explicitly bless full enforcement of 
price-gouging contracts made in cases of distress, because in 
both these cases either the promisee benefits from nonperfor-
mance (rescue in the desert is costly) or the threat was simply 
not to contract (as in the case of the hoarded water in a hurri-
cane).27  In such cases, however, full enforcement is at best 
problematic, even from the perspective of efficiency.28  In the 
case of adventitious rescue, there is by hypothesis no invest-
ment that enforcing the contract can encourage.  In both cases, 
there is hardly a market to speak of; permitting enforcement 
upholds transfers that are only barely voluntary exchanges, in 
which—if the good at issue is truly a life-saving supply in an 
emergency—one side is able to extract unlimited financial val-
ue from the other.  At best, as in the case of adventitious res-
cue, there is a bilateral monopoly; at worst, as in the case of the 
hurricane water, there is a unilateral monopoly.  The incen-
tives of contract enforcement on investment in these cases is 
unlikely to be significant, if for no other reason than that if it 
were significant, there would be a enough of a market to pre-
vent monopoly pricing in the first place.  It is no surprise, given 
the failure of the market in such cases, that many states have 
passed anti-price-gouging statutes that not only invalidate but 
also penalize such transfers.29 
To be clear, my argument is not that any extreme circum-
stances automatically lead to unconscionable price gouging that 
should be prohibited.  For example, it is no surprise that the 
 
 27. See, e.g., Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 17–18 (confirming 
that their test will uphold a price-gouging contract).  For the exception regard-
ing threats not to contract, see infra Part II.D. 
 28. It is certainly problematic from other perspectives.  See Eisenberg, su-
pra note 22, at 756 (“In terms of fairness, our society posits, as part of its mor-
al order, some degree of concern for others.”). 
 29. E.g., FLA. STAT. 501.160 (“Upon a declaration of a state of emergency 
by the Governor, it is unlawful . . . for a person or her or his agent or employee 
to rent or sell or offer to rent or sell at an unconscionable price within the area 
for which the state of emergency is declared, any essential commodity includ-
ing, but not limited to, supplies, services, provisions, or equipment that is nec-
essary for consumption or use as a direct result of the emergency.”); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney) (“During any abnormal disruption of the market 
for consumer goods and services vital and necessary for the health, safety and 
welfare of consumers, no party within the chain of distribution of such con-
sumer goods or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or ser-
vices or both for an amount which represents an unconscionably excessive 
price.”). 
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price of emergency supplies should rise in an emergency, and 
the rise alone does not indicate a problem.  As long as there is a 
functioning market, market contracts should be enforced.  But 
rewarding the rescuer or the water stockpiler with a substan-
tial windfall at the expense of those in a hard position is nei-
ther necessary to encourage productive investment nor backed 
by the general arguments in favor of upholding voluntary ex-
changes. 
To generalize somewhat, our difference on this point may 
suggest a broader statement of the disagreement I have with 
Seidenfeld and Mungan: their proposed test for duress is not 
sensitive to many desirable criteria that courts have ordinarily 
sought to evaluate when applying the doctrine of duress.  Du-
ress vitiates contracts because it undermines voluntariness; it 
removes one of the principal moral and economic bases for en-
forcing contracts in the first place—namely, that voluntary ex-
change is ordinarily both fair and efficient and that precom-
mitment is a useful mechanism for facilitating voluntary 
exchange.  This is why the doctrine of duress ordinarily re-
quires not just that a threat be “improper” (what the Rent-
Seeking Test aims to determine) but also of sufficient “gravi-
ty.”30  Though Seidenfeld and Mungan note that their focus is 
only on the impropriety and not the other elements of duress,31 
they routinely apply their test to invalidate contracts in situa-
tions where the threatened party is not under significant pres-
sure.  To the extent the Rent-Seeking Test disregards the grav-
ity of threats, it would expand the doctrine of duress to cases in 
which markets function properly—even while upholding en-
forcement in those cases where there was barely a market to 
speak of. 
In other words, the Rent-Seeking Test appears to prevent 
good bargains that achieve value for voluntarily acting parties 
who have no other way to achieve the same value.  In the case 
of the forgone trees, nobody doubts that I can in fact plant the 
trees—or set up a precommitment mechanism that will neces-
sarily cause the trees to be planted unless I enter into a con-
tract with my neighbor.  Given that, and given that the neigh-
bor wants me not to do so, obtaining a promise from me to 
avoid planting the trees may have significant value to the 
neighbor.  The neighbor is under very little pressure, however, 
from my threat. He can calmly consider whether the best use of 
 
 30. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.18 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
the “gravity” requirement). 
 31. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 11. 
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his money is to commit the $5000 to me or to some other pur-
pose.  An ordinary market is functioning.  Sure, enforcing the 
contract may cause me to invest in planting trees I don’t want 
in order to make my threat credible to the neighbor, but what is 
the alternative?  Without the possibility of enforcing the con-
tract, Seidenfeld and Mungan apparently hope to remove my 
incentive to plant the trees in the first place.  But this assumes 
I am rational, that I am aware of and understand the law, and 
so on.  If I do in fact plant the trees (hoping to extract value in 
ignorance of the Rent-Seeking Test), the Rent-Seeking Test 
would deny my neighbor the opportunity for a voluntary con-
tract to influence my behavior.  Unless Seidenfeld and Mungan 
are prepared to take away my legal right to plant the trees—in 
which case their Rent-Seeking Test is irrelevant because I 
would be threatening to commit a crime, which as they recog-
nize is already prohibited apart from the Rent-Seeking Test32—
their rule denies a valuable possibility for my neighbor, unless 
they further assume that every party is rational, fully aware of 
the law, and so on. 
As another example, consider a promisor under very little 
pressure who agrees to a nonproductive “threat” partly for 
broader contractual or reputational reasons.  For example, take 
again the case of the forgone trees and suppose the neighbor 
agrees partly because he doesn’t want to have trees blocking 
his view but also because, in the past, his property has caused a 
minor nuisance to the planter of the trees and he thinks it’s on-
ly fair to redress the balance.  (Or suppose the consideration for 
the forgone trees is not money but a reasonable in-kind conces-
sion.)  If this is the case, the neighbor is under essentially no 
pressure, and the contract is voluntary.  On what basis should 
one who favors markets void such a contract? 
There are two further general economic problems with the 
Rent-Seeking Test.  The first relates to a broad problem in le-
gal-economic reasoning that I recently identified and discussed 
in an article called False Efficiencies and Missed Opportunities 
in Law and Economics.33  As I argued in that article, legal-
economic arguments often proceed by identifying an activity 
that is more productive than its absence and then encouraging 
the law to promote it on the basis that it is productive.34  Such 
arguments are incomplete, however, because not all productive 
 
 32. Id. at 10–11. 
 33. Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law 
and Economics, 86 TUL. L. REV. 135 (2011). 
 34. See generally id. 
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activity can occur (given, for example, limits in the perfection of 
capital markets, credit markets, factor markets, and so on); as 
a result, promoting a “productive” activity might be specifically 
inefficient when that activity is compared against other activi-
ties that are even more productive.35  The Rent-Seeking Test 
suffers from this problem because it conditions a determination 
of duress merely on whether a party’s threatened activity cre-
ates some value, versus none.  But because not all potentially 
productive activity can occur, creating some value is not a suffi-
cient basis for even an economically motivated argument to dis-
tinguish favored from disfavored activity; there must be a 
broader evaluation of the consequences of a rule.  In short, a 
grain of productivity does not necessarily justify massive in-
vestment motivated by redistribution. 
Second—more concrete but related to the first problem—a 
test that asks, more or less, “What would a party have done an-
yway even if not for the opportunity to extract surplus?” 
threatens to encourage parties to become, over the long term, 
like those who would “do things anyway.”  Essentially, this con-
cern is just one about courts’ ability to evaluate long-term, ra-
ther than short-term, courses of conduct for good-faith action, 
but the concern is significant.  As an analogy, in the rules of 
baseball, a fielder may not physically interfere with a base-
runner except in a (presumably good faith) attempt to field a 
ball.36  In theory, a fielder with significant foresight could time 
his supposedly good-faith “act of fielding the ball” in order to 
interfere with a runner in a manner that would appear, in 
short-run terms, to be unavoidable.  The same is true of con-
duct under the Rent-Seeking Test.  Unless courts are extremely 
confident that they can chart a party’s motivations over very 
long time periods, the test is subject to manipulation.  For ex-
ample, in the case of the forgone trees, even if it were possible 
to determine a homeowner’s subjective valuation of trees, all a 
homeowner needs to do to achieve an enforceable contract is to 
develop a preference for trees.  Importantly, the Rent-Seeking 
Test not only fails to stop such behavior; it also affirmatively 
encouraging it, producing a potentially significant economic 
distortion. 
 
 35. Id. at 142–45. 
 36. Official Rules: 2.00 Definition of Terms, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb. 
com/mlb/official_info/official_rules/definition_terms_2.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 
2015) (“OBSTRUCTION is the act of a fielder who, while not in possession of 
the ball and not in the act of fielding the ball, impedes the progress of any 
runner.”). 
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CONTRACT MODIFICATION: NOT ENOUGH OF A 
“SPECIAL CASE” 
As I noted earlier, cases of contract modification are proba-
bly the most significant cases in which the notion of economic 
duress arises.37  Nobody thinks a court would seriously deny 
enforcement in the case of the forgone trees, but courts might 
well deny enforcement of a contract modification in which one 
party has threatened to breach in order to reallocate surplus in 
his favor.  On this topic, Seidenfeld and Mungan deserve signif-
icant praise; their argument is appropriately skeptical of the 
formalistic rules of consideration, like the legal duty rule, that 
are sometimes thought to govern this area, and it is sensitive to 
many of the considerations that should matter in contract-
modification cases.38 
Their analysis, however, does not give appropriate weight 
to the force and scope of the original contract subject to later 
modification.  Contract modification is one of the most difficult 
problems in contract law, and it is not susceptible to a simple 
solution that depends only on whether the party threatening 
breach would benefit from breach.  Clearly, the parties could 
have explicitly allocated the risk of the events that led to the 
threat of breach by contract; when they have not, the question 
of implicit allocations of risk arises, just as it does in cases of 
mistake and unexpected circumstances.  A broad inquiry is 
needed to determine where parties stand after their original 
contract; simply asking whether one party would actually bene-
fit from breach does not give effect to the parties’ intentions 
under the original contract.  To put it differently, Seidenfeld 
and Mungan’s consideration of contract-modification cases runs 
into the same general problem I discussed in Part II.B, supra: 
in focusing on one short-run economic effect, it neglects broader 
efficiencies at stake.  In this case, what it neglects specifically 
is the long-run efficiency from the prior contract.39  To be clear, 
my argument is not that contract modifications should never be 
permissible; in fact, I think they should ordinarily be permissi-
ble.  But it is impossible to decide what is appropriately per-
 
 37. See supra Part II.A. 
 38. See Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 45–50. 
 39. Cf. Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The 
Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
173, 175 (1984) (“[D]ynamic efficiency considerations focus on the long-run in-
centives for contracting parties at large imparted by a set of legal rules. In the 
modification context, these dynamic efficiency considerations adopt an ex ante 
perspective, rather than the ex post perspective implicit in the static efficiency 
considerations.”). 
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missible without considering the contracting context in which 
the parties find themselves. 
Consider Austin v. Loral.40  Austin, a subcontractor for Lo-
ral on a military contract, threatened to breach its contract to 
supply parts to Loral for radar sets to be used by the US Na-
vy.41  Austin claimed that as a result of sharply rising manufac-
turing costs, it was losing a significant amount of money on the 
contract and that it could not afford these losses.42  As a result, 
Austin stopped performing under the contract and insisted on 
price increases under the original contract and the award of a 
second contract on better terms.43  Loral agreed and made 
payments; once Austin completed performance, it then sought 
restitution of those payments, claiming duress.44 
Seidenfeld and Mungan agree with the New York Court of 
Appeal (New York’s high court), which found duress,45 rather 
than the Appellate Division (the intermediate appellate court), 
which did not.46  I agree broadly with Seidenfeld and Mungan 
that the case should turn, at least partly, on whether (1) Austin 
invented the threat of its breach merely to extract more value 
from Loral or (2) Austin found itself in legitimate hardship and 
offered Loral a way to help it avoid a mutually harmful 
breach.47  This is a good starting point for the analysis.  But I 
would emphasize different facts from those that Seidenfeld and 
Mungan emphasize.  For example, it appears, under the Rent-
Seeking Test, that they would preclude the possibility of duress 
based on the threat of breach so long as Austin would benefit 
more from breach than from performance.  That is a perverse 
result and threatens to undermine the original contract; it 
would mean that any time the price moves against a party or 
that party is otherwise in a worse situation from performing 
than from breaching, that party could threaten to hold up per-
formance on a contract without the possibility of their actions’ 
being judged wrongful.  In its undermining of the force of con-
tracts, such a result would be breathtakingly inefficient. 
Consider, similarly, a hypothetical variation of Austin that 
 
 40. 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971). 
 41. Austin Instrument Inc., v. Loral Corp, 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App. 
1970). 
 42. Id. at 530. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 531. 
 45. 272 N.E.2d at 545. 
 46. 316 N.Y.S.2d at 532–33. 
 47. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 26–28. 
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Seidenfeld and Mungan offer: suppose, “given the second con-
tract, [Austin] can achieve economies of scale. Austin can then 
make money by obtaining expensive but more sophisticated 
equipment that would allow it to produce each part more quick-
ly and cheaply.”48  In that case, Seidenfeld and Mungan would 
find no duress.  But this opportunity for Austin to benefit from 
“economies of scale” from the second contract would, under the 
Rent-Seeking Test, justify any attempt by Austin to extract 
more value from threatening to breach, because Austin’s behav-
ior would (because of the gain from the economies of scale) not 
be solely redistributive.  This returns us to the problem I iden-
tified at the end of Part II.B, supra: a small allocative gain does 
not justify bad-faith action whose force is largely distributive.  
Who knows what the relationship will be between Austin’s in-
vestment in this course of action and the total social gains from 
it?  Austin will be motivated to pursue this possibility simply if 
its own gains are greater than its own costs. The “economies of 
scale” from the second contract tell us very little about the effi-
ciency of a modification or its consistency with the original con-
tract’s allocation of risk. 
Perhaps in recognition of this point, and in tension with 
their earlier analysis of it, Seidenfeld and Mungan offer an ex-
ception to the Rent-Seeking Test in the case of contract modifi-
cation.  Their exception is apparently that the Rent-Seeking 
Test should apply, but only after courts award specific perfor-
mance instead of damages on all contracts.49  For several rea-
sons, however, this is neither practical nor desirable.  For one 
thing, specific performance may be impossible in many of the 
cases in which contract modification arises; for example, if Aus-
tin truly could not afford to perform the original contract, a de-
cree of specific performance would not be helpful and would not 
meaningfully change the analysis.  Second, specific perfor-
mance has significant potential costs that need to be weighed 
against its benefits.50  It will not do to wave the problem of im-
perfect remedies away by assuming that courts have perfect 
remedies at their disposal.  Third, specific performance is not a 
sufficient remedy to avoid the problems that Seidenfeld and 
Mungan seek for it to avoid, because a suit for specific perfor-
mance still requires the plaintiffs to incur potentially substan-
 
 48. Id. at 27. 
 49. Id. at 50–51. 
 50. See generally Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 
273 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (weighing the costs and benefits of specific per-
formance versus expectation damages). 
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tial transaction costs, and nothing prevents such costs from be-
ing significantly greater than those the defendants must incur 
if they are sued.  Fourth, Seidenfeld and Mungan assume that 
the parties’ “initial agreement” contemplates specific perfor-
mance rather than damages, but they give no reason for this 
assumption.51 
More to the point, however, courts do not already award 
specific performance in all contracts cases.  Perhaps they 
should do so more often than they do; this would, among other 
things, undercut most of the unpersuasive and severely prob-
lematic arguments that legal economists have made over the 
years for a “theory of efficient breach,” the main force of which 
is to weigh in against specific performance.52  It would be ironic 
if inherent in Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument were the 
proposition that the theory of efficient breach must be incorrect 
and specific performance must instead be universally available.  
But to say that is just a rhetorical flourish; my main analytical 
point is that, without universal adoption in courts of specific 
enforcement, it is unclear where the Rent-Seeking Test stands 
as a basis for evaluating contract modifications.  Following the 
logic of Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument, it would be seem to 
be entirely inapplicable—which would undermine their argu-
ment severely because, as I have previously noted, cases of con-
tract modification are the principal cases in which economic 
duress might be relevant.53 
How should contract modifications be decided, then?  I do 
not believe there is any simple formula, even if the only goal is 
to achieve efficiency.  Relevant factors include (1) how much 
circumstances have changed from the initial contract, because 
modifications (or even just changes to allocations of the con-
tractual surplus) contemplated and ruled out, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, by the original contract should not be enforced; and (2) 
how much the threat of breach restricts the opportunities 
available to the promisee.  The first of these factors matters be-
cause of the allocation of risk under the parties’ specific con-
tract; the second of these factors matters because of parties’ 
general tendencies—if they are fair-minded and rational—to 
avoid hold-up problems. 
 
 51. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 51. 
 52. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 997–1014 (2005) (arguing against the “theory of efficient 
breach”). 
 53. See supra Part II.A. 
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The good faith of the promisor—the one threatening breach 
and requesting a modification—also matters, but this must be 
conceived more broadly than the Rent-Seeking Test would al-
low (because, again, the Rent-Seeking Test would endorse any 
modification in which the party threatening breach would pre-
fer breach to performance).  Whether the promisor is attempt-
ing opportunistically to reallocate surplus, versus asking for a 
fair modification, should influence the enforceability of a modi-
fication, for parties would probably desire for it to do so in the 
general case—largely because it is broadly fair and efficient to 
uphold good-faith reallocations. 
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION: THE EXCEPTION THAT 
SWALLOWS (AND UNDERMINES) THE RULE 
Finally, an even more significant limitation that Seidenfeld 
and Mungan impose on the Rent-Seeking Test—that it should 
not apply to ordinary contract modification54—shows the prob-
lems with that test.  The exception they propose also threatens 
to swallow the rule, because there appears to be no principled 
basis on which they can distinguish the cases in which the rule 
applies from the cases in which the exception applies. 
Their proposed exception to the Rent-Seeking Test looks 
simple enough: the Rent-Seeking Test does not apply (to invali-
date a contract) when a threat is merely to refuse to conclude a 
contract, even if such a threat is otherwise “rent-seeking.”  Spe-
cifically, their explicit exception is for “rent-seeking by threat-
ening to walk away from contract negotiations, leaving the sta-
tus quo ante.”55 
This exception is necessary because the Rent-Seeking Test 
threatens to invalidate many routine and desirable mecha-
nisms for precommitment, including contract negotiations gen-
erally.  The case that Seidenfeld and Mungan have in mind to 
justify the exception for “threatening to walk away from con-
tract negotiations” is relatively simple: a buyer offers $5 for a 
book, and the seller refuses to sell at that price even though the 
book is worth less than $5 to the seller.56  This refusal is “rent-
seeking,” under Seidenfeld and Mungan’s definition, because it 
simply seeks more of the contractual surplus without any hope 
of producing wealth.57  But it is clear that the refusal must be 
 
 54. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 45–49. 
 55. Id. at 39. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 40–41. 
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allowed; otherwise, anyone could force a contract simply by of-
fering a price better than the other party’s reservation value. 
For example, if I suspect that the lowest price at which a car 
dealership would sell a car is $25,000, I could force the dealer-
ship to enter a contract with me by offering $25,000 to buy the 
car, thereby preventing the dealership from negotiating with 
me (or anyone else) further.  Such further negotiations would 
fail the unmodified Rent-Seeking Test. 
This exception, however, relies on several arbitrary distinc-
tions.  Most importantly, an arbitrary reliance on the status 
quo ante would restore a sort of distinction between acts and 
omissions to a consequentialist analysis in which it has no 
place.  Seidenfeld and Mungan’s exception appears to depend 
on the proposition that it is worse to destroy $500 in value than 
to walk away from an opportunity to create $500.  That is, Sei-
denfeld and Mungan are concerned about causing harm but not 
about destroying a mere opportunity for gain.  But those pur-
porting to promote economic efficiency should be the first to 
recognize that there is no principled distinction between those 
two cases.  To a rational, risk-neutral consequentialist, a for-
gone $500 opportunity is just as significant as $500 harm.  The 
status quo ante—in effect, the number 0—has no special place 
in a consequentialist analysis, which is appropriately concerned 
only with the greatest possible value going forward.  Value ex 
post, rather than ex ante, is the only driver of consequentialist 
policy.58  
Nonetheless, it is easy to see why Seidenfeld and Mungan 
propose an exception for contract negotiations; without that ex-
ception, they would commit themselves to treating most ordi-
nary contractual offers as rent-seeking and thus as cases of du-
ress.  After all, every offer is a potential threat, and it is a 
typical goal in contract negotiations for a rational, self-
interested party to extract as much of the contractual surplus 
as possible. 
In addition to being arbitrary, the exception is also not 
broad enough.  Once the need to shield ordinary contract nego-
tiations is recognized, it becomes clear that the simple case of 
contract negotiations (or a distinction between destroying an 
opportunity and destroying existing value) is not sufficient to 
exhaust the appropriate exceptions to the Rent-Seeking Test.  
Consider a slight variation to the example above involving the 
 
 58. Similarly, it would not be principled to distinguish threats to do noth-
ing from threats to destroy value, because doing nothing may, depending on 
context, destroy value. 
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sale of a book: the owner of a book says to the buyer, “If you 
don’t offer $12 right now, I’ll destroy the book.”  In making this 
threat, the seller is not threatening merely to “walk away” from 
contract negotiations, nor is he threatening to restore the sta-
tus quo ante—because if he carries through with the threat, the 
status of the book will be changed irrevocably.  Yet it would be 
an extreme result if the seller were not able to destroy his own 
book, or (more realistically) to use a threat of its destruction as 
a precommitment device to indicate to the buyer the immuta-
bility of his own reservation price.59  And this analysis does not 
depend on the book’s destruction; it would apply even if the 
owner of the book merely had said, “If you don’t offer $12 right 
now, I promise I will not negotiate with you in the future”—for 
that would change the status quo ante by eliminating the pos-
sibility of potentially profitable negotiations.  Likewise for “If 
you don’t offer $12 right now, I will lock the book in a mechani-
cal safe from which it cannot emerge for a year.” 
Perhaps more importantly, a similar analysis applies to 
many familiar mechanisms of contract negotiation, such as a 
so-called first-price sealed-bid auction in which a party invites 
competing bids and agrees to accept the best bid after a single 
round of bidding, foreclosing all future negotiation.60  As to any 
individual bidder, the auctioneer is not threatening to restore 
the status quo ante; he is artificially threatening to foreclose all 
opportunity of future negotiation even if such negotiation could 
be productive ex post, and he is doing so merely in the hope of 
extracting a greater surplus from the auction—not because go-
ing with the winner of the first round of bidding is productive 
on its own.  Clearly, the mere use of this popular auction mech-
anism won’t—and shouldn’t—amount to economic duress.61 
 
 59. Moreover, who is to say that the owner doesn’t enjoy—that is, derive 
some subjective pleasure—from destroying books that he owns?  How would a 
court ever make the determination that the threat carried with it no benefit to 
the seller?  See supra Part II.A & II.B. 
 60. For a recent discussion of this and similar auction mechanisms in the 
context of business sales, see Jay Kesten, Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, 23 
YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that most such mechanisms should 
be permitted on grounds of efficiency). 
 61. To elaborate somewhat, all cases where a party makes a precommit-
ment are cases in which that party potentially destroys some value otherwise 
available to him or her; that is the nature of precommitment, and surely some 
precommitments are productive (or else contract law is worthless). The Rent-
Seeking Test voids only those precommitments that, if carried through, will 
subtract value from a party’s original position rather than fail to capture the 
opportunities available to that party. But that distinction cannot matter from 
the perspective of traditional wealth-maximization, because nothing in ration-
al-actor economics distinguishes the waste of existing value from the waste of 
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In short, it is arbitrary to single out the status quo ante as 
a baseline against which changes are to be evaluated.  It is not 
a principled baseline for a consequentialist analysis.  As a re-
sult, the exception for contractual negotiations is insufficient to 
prevent a variety of routine and productive precommitment de-
vices.  If the exception were expanded, though, it would be hard 
to know how to rule in a first-price sealed-bid auction but rule 
out the case of the forgone trees. 
CONCLUSION 
Duress is both more and less than rent-seeking.  The Rent-
Seeking Test that Seidenfeld and Mungan propose could never 
be applied, has limited relevance in the most significant cases 
to which it might apply (those of contract modification), ne-
glects the longer-term efficiencies of both contract law and 
property law, and requires exceptions that undermine most of 
its force. 
The limitations of Seidenfeld and Mungan’s arguments 
show, perhaps, a problem with their underlying endeavor.  It is 
helpful, as a matter of pure theoretical microeconomic argu-
ments, to isolate economic effects and to derive conclusions 
about them.  Short-run efficiencies of transactions, evaluated in 
a context-free manner, are theoretically interesting.  But as ar-
guments about the law—even if they were presented as partial, 
incomplete solutions to legal problems—abstract economic 
analyses often fall short because of concerns about administra-
bility and because they neglect broader efficiencies that incor-
porate dynamic considerations, context, and long-run effects.  
These problems are different from those that typical critiques 
of legal-economic arguments identify; for example, only in pass-
ing in this Essay have I made reference to the fact that parties 
are not fully rational or informed.  They reflect problems with 
the inner logic of many modern legal-economic arguments: in 
short, they do not in fact produce efficient results. 
 
 
an opportunity. 
